vercel-deploy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/deploy.shscript creates a compressed archive of the project source code and transmits it to a Vercel-owned endpoint (https://claude-skills-deploy.vercel.com/api/deploy) usingcurlto facilitate 'claimable' deployments. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The archiving mechanism in
scripts/deploy.shusestarto collect all project files with minimal exclusions (onlynode_modulesand.git). This broad collection behavior is likely to capture sensitive environment files (e.g.,.env,.env.local) or other secret-bearing configuration files present in the root directory, resulting in their exposure to the remote endpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands, including
tarfor archiving,curlfor network transfers, and the officialvercelCLI for standard project management and deployment operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with the Vercel API and CLI infrastructure, which are established technology services.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted project data and metadata to drive its deployment logic.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/deploy.shscript readspackage.jsonand the project file list to detect frameworks and package assets. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit safety instructions to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious content embedded within the project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
tar,curl,vercel), file system operations, and network exfiltration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the ingested project data before it is processed by the deployment logic.
Audit Metadata