unity-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions in SKILL.md directing the AI agent to "automatically" modify system configuration files when a user requests setup. This encourages the agent to bypass standard verification steps for sensitive file operations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/setup.sh file executes shell commands and inline Python scripts to modify AI agent configuration files, including ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.codex/config.toml, and ~/.gemini/settings.json. Modifying these files is a sensitive operation as they define the agent's behavior and security boundaries.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the installation of an external Unity package from https://github.com/CoplayDev/unity-mcp.git. While intended for functionality, users should verify the contents of third-party repositories before installation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via read_console (Unity logs) and get_tests results.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to high-privilege tools including Bash, execute_custom_tool, and manage_editor across its toolset.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the Unity console output or test data before it is processed by the agent was found.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 07:25 AM