agentation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides configuration instructions for AI agents (Claude Code, Gemini CLI) that install shell hooks (
UserPromptSubmit,AfterAgent). These hooks automatically execute acurl | python3pipeline every time a user sends a message or the agent finishes a turn. This creates a persistent command execution surface that relies on the integrity of the local server atlocalhost:4747. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The automated hooks for Claude Code and Gemini CLI use a piped execution pattern:
curl ... | python3 -c "...". While the Python code is currently inline and visible in the instructions, this pattern is inherently risky as it executes logic fetched from a network endpoint (/pending) without integrity verification. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/setup-agentation-mcp.shscript and theSKILL.mdinstructions frequently usenpx -y agentation-mcp server. This command downloads and executes the latest version of theagentation-mcppackage from the npm registry without version pinning, introducing a supply-chain risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include
developer_instructionsfor Codex and markdown for other agents that provide high-level directives to 'call agentation_watch_annotations in a loop' and 'fix the code'. While intended for functionality, these instructions override default agent behavior to create an autonomous loop. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The React component includes a
webhookUrlprop that, if configured, sends UI annotation data (including CSS selectors, bounding boxes, and potentially sensitive 'nearbyText') to an external URL.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://localhost:4747/pending - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata