agentic-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The Dockerfile section in
SKILL.mdfetches an installation script from the official Claude.ai domain (https://claude.ai/install.sh). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a pattern in
SKILL.mdthat pipes a remote script fromhttps://claude.ai/install.shdirectly into the shell (| sh) during a Docker build process. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality.
- Ingestion points: The Git workflow in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to ingest untrusted data by checking out pull requests (gh pr checkout) and analyzing source code files. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the pull request data or source files.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for powerful tools including
BashandWrite, which could be exploited if the agent follows instructions found in untrusted data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content is specified before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://claude.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata