mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The
MCPConnectionStdioclass inscripts/connections.pyutilizes themcp.client.stdio.stdio_clientfunction to execute local system commands. - Evidence: The
_create_contextmethod passesself.command,self.args, andself.envdirectly to theStdioServerParametersconstructor. - Risk: If an agent receives instructions (via prompt injection or malicious data) to create a connection with a malicious command (e.g.,
rm -rf /or a reverse shell), the skill will execute it with the privileges of the agent process. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The
MCPConnectionSSEandMCPConnectionHTTPclasses allow the agent to initiate outbound network requests to arbitrary URLs. - Evidence: The classes take a
urlandheadersdictionary and pass them tosse_clientorstreamablehttp_clientrespectively. - Risk: These methods could be used to send sensitive local data or environment variables (found in the agent's context) to an attacker-controlled endpoint by embedding data in the URL path, query parameters, or request headers.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): While not direct remote code execution in the traditional sense, the ability to connect to an untrusted MCP server via
SSEorHTTPmeans the agent will then interact with tools defined by that remote server. - Risk: A malicious remote MCP server can return tool definitions or outputs designed to exploit the agent's reasoning or trick it into performing dangerous actions on the local host.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata