huashu-agent-swarm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/dashboard.pyscript is vulnerable to shell command injection. Thesend_human_inputfunction takes user-provided messages from the/api/inputendpoint and interpolates them directly into agit commitcommand that is executed viasubprocess.run(shell=True). This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,&) in the input message. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/agent_loop.shscript executes the Claude CLI with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This configuration removes the human-in-the-loop requirement for sensitive actions, such as file system modifications or command execution, granting the autonomous agents unrestricted access to the host environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The monitoring dashboard in
scripts/dashboard.pybinds to0.0.0.0(all network interfaces) by default and does not require authentication. This configuration makes internal project data, including git logs, task lists, and full agent execution logs, accessible to any device on the same network. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/agent-prompt-template.mdincludes explicit instructions that command the AI to override safety protocols. It instructs the agent to "Never request human help or confirmation" and to disregard operational constraints, which can be exploited if the agent processes malicious input from the repository. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's instructions encourage agents to autonomously install third-party dependencies and run tests. Since the agents operate without a sandbox or human oversight, they could be manipulated into downloading and executing malicious code from external registries or the project's own codebase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata