nav-init
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Persistence & Command Execution] (HIGH): The skill modifies
.claude/settings.jsonto register aPostToolUsehook. This configuration forces the agent to automatically execute an external Python script (monitor-tokens.py) after every invocation of theWrite,Edit,Bash, orTasktools. This introduces a persistent and potentially hidden execution layer within the agent's core operational loop. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to injection via local project metadata.
- Ingestion points: The
detect_project_infofunction reads untrusted strings frompackage.json,pyproject.toml, and other project configuration files. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill interpolates these strings directly into templates for
CLAUDE.mdandDEVELOPMENT-README.mdwithout delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andReadtools. If a project file contains malicious instructions that are written intoCLAUDE.md, the agent will read and potentially obey them in future turns. - Sanitization: None. There is no evidence of validation or escaping for the project name or tech stack data before it is written to the file system.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill executes shell commands that interact with the user's home directory (
${HOME}/.claude/plugins/...). While intended for template copying, this pattern relies on environment variables and hardcoded paths that could be exploited if the environment is compromised.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata