telegram-reminders
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The
scripts/setup.tsfile usesexecSyncto configure the Convex environment. It interpolates thebotTokenanduserIddirectly into a shell command string. While this occurs during an explicit setup phase, it creates a potential command injection surface if an attacker can influence the arguments passed to the setup script. - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (LOW): The skill stores the Telegram Bot Token, User ID, and Convex Deploy Key in plain text within
/mnt/user-data/outputs/telegram_config.json. This is standard for CLI-based tools but means any process with access to the user's data directory can read these secrets. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (SAFE): During setup, the skill executes
npm installandnpx convex deploy. These downloads originate from trusted registries (NPM) and known service providers (Convex), and are required for the skill's functionality. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], these are categorized as SAFE/LOW. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (SAFE): Analysis confirms that the skill only communicates with
api.telegram.organd the user's specific*.convex.clouddeployment. No unauthorized data exfiltration was detected. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data (message text and titles) which are eventually sent to Telegram or stored in the Convex database.
- Ingestion points:
message_textandtitlearguments insend_message.tsandschedule_message.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent; inputs are passed directly to the API/DB.
- Capability inventory: System command execution (
execSyncin setup), network requests (fetch), and file reading (readFileSync). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of message content is performed before transmission.
Audit Metadata