explain-algorand-x402-python
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 12, 2026
The skill consists of three markdown files: SKILL.md, references/EXAMPLES.md, and references/REFERENCE.md. These files serve as documentation for the 'x402-avm' Python package.
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Prompt Injection: No patterns indicative of prompt injection (e.g., 'IMPORTANT: Ignore', 'You are now jailbroken') were found in any of the files. The language is technical and instructional.
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Data Exfiltration: The skill itself does not contain any commands or code that would exfiltrate sensitive data. While the Python code examples demonstrate the use of
os.environ["AVM_PRIVATE_KEY"]and interaction with Algorand network nodes (e.g.,https://testnet-api.algonode.cloud), this is part of the described package's intended functionality and is presented as example code for the user, not executed by the AI agent. The skill does not send this data to untrusted external servers. -
Obfuscation: No malicious obfuscation techniques (e.g., multi-layer Base64, zero-width characters, homoglyphs) were detected. Base64 encoding/decoding is explicitly mentioned and used in the Python examples for legitimate cryptographic operations related to Algorand transaction handling, which is standard practice for the protocol.
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Unverifiable Dependencies: The skill describes
pip installcommands for thex402-avmpackage, which is distributed via PyPI (a trusted package registry). It also references the package's GitHub repository (https://github.com/GoPlausible/x402-avm/). While 'GoPlausible' is not on the list of trusted GitHub organizations, this is a reference to source code and not a direct download/execution by the AI agent. The primary installation method described is from PyPI. Since the skill is purely descriptive and does not execute these installation commands, this is considered an informational finding rather than a direct threat from the agent's execution. -
Privilege Escalation: No commands (e.g.,
sudo,chmod 777) that would attempt to escalate privileges were found. -
Persistence Mechanisms: No commands (e.g., modifying
.bashrc, creating cron jobs) that would establish persistence were found. -
Metadata Poisoning: The skill's name and description in
SKILL.mdare clean and accurately reflect the skill's purpose. -
Indirect Prompt Injection: The skill is documentation and does not process external user-supplied content, so it is not susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
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Time-Delayed / Conditional Attacks: No conditional logic or time-based triggers for malicious behavior were found.
Conclusion: The skill is a well-documented, informational resource. It does not contain any executable components for the AI agent and poses no direct security risks. The external references are for legitimate software and documentation, with the primary package distribution being from a trusted source (PyPI).