llm-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
classifyTicketPromptfunction inSKILL.mddemonstrates an unsafe pattern for prompt construction where untrusted user input is directly interpolated into the prompt string.\n - Ingestion points: The
ticketparameter inclassifyTicketPrompt(SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt template does not use delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) to isolate the user input.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill includes examples using an Anthropic client to execute these prompts via
client.messages.create(SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering before the input is used in the prompt template.
Audit Metadata