workspace

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs extensive shell commands including ls, grep, find, and cat to discover and analyze project structure and code patterns.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: It implements multi-repo support by accessing sibling directories (e.g., ls ../*.git), which expands the agent's operational scope beyond the primary repository root.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The analysis protocol specifically reads ../*/.git/config to extract remote URLs, which can inadvertently expose authentication tokens or private repository locations if stored in the git configuration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it automatically ingests and processes untrusted content from the local workspace to generate project specifications.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion points: The skill reads directory structures, code files, and configuration manifests (e.g., package.json, pyproject.toml, .git/config) across the entire workspace (SKILL.md).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within the files it analyzes.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Capability inventory: The agent has shell execution capabilities for discovery and file-writing capabilities to generate artifacts in the _project_specs/workspace/ directory (SKILL.md).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data extracted from workspace files before it is included in the generated context artifacts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 3, 2026, 06:31 AM