twilio-sms

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly ingests untrusted, user-generated content via the /twilio/inbound webhook (reads req.body.Body and MediaUrl0) and acts on it (keyword parsing, ticket creation, opt-out handling, status-driven fallbacks), so third-party messages/media can directly influence actions and tool use.

HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

• Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the document for literal, high-entropy credentials. I found an explicit auth-token-looking value used for TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN in multiple environment examples:
• TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef

This is a 32-character hex string (high-entropy pattern) directly present in env examples and the systemd env example. Even though it resembles a patterned example (the hex sequence is obviously synthetic), it matches the definition of a literal credential in docs and could be mistaken for a real token if copy-pasted. Other obvious placeholders (AC..., YOUR_ACCOUNT_SID, YOUR_MG_SID, etc.), truncated values, SIDs (SM..., PN...), and simple example passwords were treated as documentation placeholders and ignored per the rules.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

• Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes explicit sudo install commands and instructions to create/modify system files (systemd unit under /etc/systemd, nginx conf, secret files under /etc), which direct changes requiring elevated privileges and thus risk compromising the host state.