skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/mcp/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcp

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill allows for the execution of arbitrary system commands through the /mcp add CLI command and the registry.addServer API. This can be exploited to run unauthorized or malicious binaries on the host system.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill documentation and implementation rely on npx -y to install and run MCP servers (e.g., @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem). This allows unverified third-party code to be downloaded and executed at runtime.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The skill manages sensitive environment variables such as GITHUB_TOKEN. Documentation suggests hardcoding or passing these via configuration, which increases the risk of credential exposure if the local configuration is accessed.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill fetches multiple dependencies from the @modelcontextprotocol scope. While these are part of the MCP ecosystem, they are external packages that are not pinned to specific versions in the provided examples, posing a supply-chain risk.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is a major vector for indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external tools, resources, and searches. 1. Ingestion points: Data returned from registry.callTool and registry.readResource. 2. Boundary markers: None; tool results are directly concatenated into the response string in index.ts. 3. Capability inventory: Command execution, filesystem access, and network operations through configured MCP servers. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of tool-provided content is performed before presentation to the agent context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
  • Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 08:52 PM