skills/alsk1992/cloddsbot/permissions/Gen Agent Trust Hub

permissions

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill provides a command (/perms mode full) that explicitly disables all security restrictions. This 'full' mode allows the execution of any system command, which is inherently dangerous if accessible to an automated agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill enables runtime modification of the command allowlist via /perms allow <pattern>. An agent with access to this tool can grant itself permission to execute any binary, bypassing the intended security boundaries of the host environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): There is a high risk of 'Self-Escalation' via prompt injection. An attacker could provide a prompt that instructs the agent to run /perms mode full or /perms allow *. Since the skill does not distinguish between human-initiated policy changes and agent-initiated ones, the agent may unwittingly dismantle its own security sandbox.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes command patterns and agent IDs from potentially untrusted inputs.
  • Ingestion points: The execute function in index.ts parses the args string which contains user-provided command patterns and agent identifiers.
  • Boundary markers: None. The instructions are interpolated directly into the permission logic.
  • Capability inventory: Access to execApprovals.setSecurityConfig and execApprovals.addToAllowlist in index.ts which control the underlying system's ability to spawn subprocesses.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill accepts regex and glob patterns without validation, allowing for broad or potentially malicious pattern matching.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 08:51 PM