amina-init
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions explicitly command the agent to override standard human-in-the-loop safety protocols.
- Evidence in
SKILL.md: "Run commands automatically, complete workflows end-to-end, never ask unnecessary questions." - Evidence in
references/usage.md: "Hands-free execution: Run all commands automatically without asking for permission. Never ask 'Want me to...?' or 'Should I...?' — just do it." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on the automated execution of shell commands for environment setup and workflow management.
- Evidence in
references/setup.md: Usespip install,amina auth status, and environment checks (which python,python --version). - Evidence in
references/usage.md: Provides patterns foramina run,amina jobs wait, andamina jobs downloadfor various scientific tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the installation of software packages from public registries.
- Evidence in
references/setup.md: Instructions to upgrade the vendor's packageamina-cliand install third-party librariesbiopythonandmatplotlibviapiporuv. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While not directly exfiltrating data, the skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, presenting a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads PDB, FASTA, and CSV files, and uses
WebSearchto retrieve protein data from the internet. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed files are provided.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands and modify the Python environment.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of external file content or search results is performed before the data influences agent actions.
Audit Metadata