sprintflint-api

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The README.md instructions recommend installation via npx skills add Ancez/sprintflint-skills. The repository/user 'Ancez' is not a trusted source according to the predefined list of organizations and repositories.
  • [PERSISTENCE] (MEDIUM): The documentation explicitly instructs users to modify shell configuration files such as ~/.bashrc and ~/.zshrc to store SPRINTFLINT_API_TOKEN. While this is a common method for managing environment variables, these are sensitive files often targeted for persistence mechanisms.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill performs network operations using curl to sprintflint.com. This domain is not on the established whitelist for network operations. However, this is consistent with the skill's primary stated purpose.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data (titles, descriptions, comments) from the SprintFlint API via GET requests.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or safety instructions are defined to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform state-changing operations including creating, updating, and deleting projects, sprints, issues, and comments via POST, PATCH, and DELETE requests.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the external API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:31 PM