Plugin Settings
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill design allows for Indirect Prompt Injection by design. It defines a pattern where an agent reads configuration and task instructions from local files (
.claude/*.local.md) which could be modified by external processes or previously written by the agent itself. - Evidence:
- Ingestion points: Scripts in
references/real-world-examples.md(e.g.,stop-hook.sh) andexamples/read-settings-hook.shread from.claude/multi-agent-swarm.local.mdand.claude/ralph-loop.local.md. - Boundary markers: The scripts use
sedandawkto extract content but do not wrap the interpolated text in protective delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Writeto create/update these files and uses hooks to block/alter agent behavior based on their contents. - Sanitization: While
examples/create-settings-command.mdinstructs the agent to sanitize input, the processing scripts themselves perform no sanitization on the extracted text before it is used as a prompt or system message. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill includes examples that use
tmux send-keysto interact with other terminal sessions based on configuration file values. - Evidence:
- In
references/real-world-examples.md, theagent-stop-notification.shscript executestmux send-keys -t "$COORDINATOR_SESSION" "$NOTIFICATION" Enter. If theCOORDINATOR_SESSIONorAGENT_NAMEfields are manipulated, this could be used to send unauthorized keystrokes to other active tmux sessions owned by the user.
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