Plugin Settings

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill design allows for Indirect Prompt Injection by design. It defines a pattern where an agent reads configuration and task instructions from local files (.claude/*.local.md) which could be modified by external processes or previously written by the agent itself.
  • Evidence:
  • Ingestion points: Scripts in references/real-world-examples.md (e.g., stop-hook.sh) and examples/read-settings-hook.sh read from .claude/multi-agent-swarm.local.md and .claude/ralph-loop.local.md.
  • Boundary markers: The scripts use sed and awk to extract content but do not wrap the interpolated text in protective delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Write to create/update these files and uses hooks to block/alter agent behavior based on their contents.
  • Sanitization: While examples/create-settings-command.md instructs the agent to sanitize input, the processing scripts themselves perform no sanitization on the extracted text before it is used as a prompt or system message.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill includes examples that use tmux send-keys to interact with other terminal sessions based on configuration file values.
  • Evidence:
  • In references/real-world-examples.md, the agent-stop-notification.sh script executes tmux send-keys -t "$COORDINATOR_SESSION" "$NOTIFICATION" Enter. If the COORDINATOR_SESSION or AGENT_NAME fields are manipulated, this could be used to send unauthorized keystrokes to other active tmux sessions owned by the user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 04:37 PM