plugin-settings

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The agent-stop-notification.sh script in references/real-world-examples.md extracts fields from .claude/multi-agent-swarm.local.md and uses them in a tmux send-keys command. Since the keys are sent to a target session, an attacker who can modify the settings file can inject arbitrary shell commands that will be executed by the shell in the coordinator's tmux session.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The ralph-loop pattern facilitates indirect prompt injection by using file content as agent instructions.
  • Ingestion points: .claude/ralph-loop.local.md body.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The hooks/stop-hook.sh script extracts the entire markdown body as the reason for the agent's next action.
  • Capability inventory: Influences agent state via jq output.
  • Sanitization: Absent.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (SAFE): The example hook read-settings-hook.sh includes preventative checks for path traversal and sensitive file access.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 04:52 PM