skills/anthropics/skills/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill is designed to ingest and process content from external PDF files, which is a known vector for untrusted data input.
  • Ingestion points: PDF content is read using libraries like pypdf, pdfplumber, and pdftotext as implemented in SKILL.md and scripts such as extract_form_structure.py.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or markers to separate the extracted file content from the agent's internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables operations such as file system access, image processing, and the execution of external command-line utilities.
  • Sanitization: Content extracted from PDFs is processed directly by the parsing libraries and provided to the agent without an intermediate sanitization layer.
  • [Command Execution]: The skill's documentation guides the use of various system-level command-line tools for document manipulation.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and forms.md describe workflows involving qpdf, pdftotext, pdftk, and magick/convert for tasks like merging files and cropping images.
  • [Dynamic Execution]: One of the provided scripts modifies the behavior of a dependency at runtime to ensure compatibility.
  • Evidence: In scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, the monkeypatch_pydpf_method function is used to alter the pypdf library's DictionaryObject.get_inherited method. This pattern of dynamic library modification is used here to ensure form field attributes are correctly inherited during the filling process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 12:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf