Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill is designed to ingest and process content from external PDF files, which is a known vector for untrusted data input.
- Ingestion points: PDF content is read using libraries like
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdftotextas implemented inSKILL.mdand scripts such asextract_form_structure.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or markers to separate the extracted file content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables operations such as file system access, image processing, and the execution of external command-line utilities.
- Sanitization: Content extracted from PDFs is processed directly by the parsing libraries and provided to the agent without an intermediate sanitization layer.
- [Command Execution]: The skill's documentation guides the use of various system-level command-line tools for document manipulation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandforms.mddescribe workflows involvingqpdf,pdftotext,pdftk, andmagick/convertfor tasks like merging files and cropping images. - [Dynamic Execution]: One of the provided scripts modifies the behavior of a dependency at runtime to ensure compatibility.
- Evidence: In
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, themonkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction is used to alter thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod. This pattern of dynamic library modification is used here to ensure form field attributes are correctly inherited during the filling process.
Audit Metadata