skills/anthropics/skills/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The script scripts/office/soffice.py dynamically generates and compiles C code at runtime. It writes a shim to a temporary location and uses gcc to compile it into a shared object (.so). This library is then injected into the soffice process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. While this is a sophisticated technical solution for enabling LibreOffice in restricted environments, runtime compilation and library injection are high-risk behaviors. The severity is set to MEDIUM because this logic is a core part of the primary skill purpose for handling office documents.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is designed to extract and process content from user-provided .pptx files, which creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via markitdown as seen in SKILL.md and editing.md (e.g., python -m markitdown presentation.pptx).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundary markers or provide the agent with specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the extracted presentation text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including subprocess execution (gcc, soffice, pdftoppm, git) and file system manipulation (scripts/clean.py unlinks files).
  • Sanitization: The skill mitigates XML-related risks (like XXE) by consistently using the defusedxml library for parsing throughout its scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:51 PM