pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF documents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if those documents contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: External PDF files are ingested through various tools and scripts for text extraction, table analysis, and form processing (e.g., PdfReader, pdfplumber, pytesseract).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing or displaying extracted text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system read/write operations and execution of system CLI tools (qpdf, poppler-utils).
  • Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization of extracted PDF content before it is processed or presented to the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements a runtime monkeypatch for the pypdf library to correct a known issue with selection list formatting.
  • Evidence: The monkeypatch_pydpf_method function replaces DictionaryObject.get_inherited with a custom implementation. While this is a form of dynamic code modification, the logic is static and serves a legitimate functional purpose for the skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 11:58 AM