Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF documents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if those documents contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: External PDF files are ingested through various tools and scripts for text extraction, table analysis, and form processing (e.g.,
PdfReader,pdfplumber,pytesseract). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing or displaying extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system read/write operations and execution of system CLI tools (qpdf, poppler-utils).
- Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization of extracted PDF content before it is processed or presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch for thepypdflibrary to correct a known issue with selection list formatting. - Evidence: The
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction replacesDictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation. While this is a form of dynamic code modification, the logic is static and serves a legitimate functional purpose for the skill.
Audit Metadata