autoteam-chatgpt-rotation
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). This project explicitly automates mass/temporary ChatGPT Team account creation and rotation, includes instructions to evade detection (residential proxies, delay tuning), and synchronizes authentication files to an external CPA endpoint — behaviors that enable credential exfiltration, large-scale abuse of service quotas, and circumvention of provider protections.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's runtime workflow explicitly uses Playwright to browse and automate ChatGPT registration pages and ingests temporary-email content from a third-party service (CloudMail) — see the "轮转流程", Playwright/browser automation and CloudMail API configuration in SKILL.md and src/browser.py — meaning the agent reads and acts on external, public third-party content during execution, which could permit indirect instruction injection.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's one‑click install runs "git clone https://github.com/cnitlrt/AutoTeam.git" followed by "bash setup.sh", which fetches remote code from that repository and executes it at install/runtime, so the git URL is a runtime external dependency that executes remote code.
Issues (3)
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata