moss-tts-nano-speech
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches model code and text processing dependencies from external GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: Downloads from
https://github.com/OpenMOSS/MOSS-TTS-Nano.gitandhttps://github.com/WhizZest/WeTextProcessing.git. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands to set up the Python environment and run model inference.
- Evidence: CLI commands such as
conda create,pip install -e ., andmoss-tts-nano serve. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it synthesizes speech from external, potentially untrusted text.
- Ingestion points: The
textandtext-fileparameters in thegenerateCLI command and theinferPython method found inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions embedded in the input text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write audio files to the local filesystem via
soundfile.write, make local HTTP requests viarequests.post, and execute system processes via themoss-tts-nanoCLI. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not mention any validation or sanitization of the input text before processing.
Audit Metadata