openclaw-config
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive file paths containing authentication credentials:
~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json(Anthropic API tokens),~/.openclaw/credentials/telegram/*/token.txt(Telegram bot tokens),~/.openclaw/credentials/bird/cookies.json(X/Twitter session cookies), and~/.openclaw/openclaw.json(Main configuration containing channel auth and plugin settings). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides numerous bash commands for system monitoring, log analysis, and process manipulation. It frequently uses
jqto perform destructive edits on the main configuration file. - [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Facilitates the installation and execution of external modules and autonomous agents: Encourages use of
clawdhub installandnpx add-skillto download and integrate remote code from external repositories. It also documents the use of autonomous sub-agents (e.g.,codex,claude) using flags like--full-autoor--yolo, which allow agents to execute generated code without manual approval. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted chat transcripts from various messaging platforms. 1. Ingestion points: Reads
~/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/*.jsonl, which contains messages from WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram. 2. Boundary markers: None; log content is parsed and rendered directly to the terminal/agent context. 3. Capability inventory: Config modification viajq, shell access, and sub-agent spawning. 4. Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the message content during parsing. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: Mentions and manages
~/.openclaw/cron/jobs.json, which defines scheduled autonomous tasks that persist across sessions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata