skills/arcanexis/alice-single/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The script ooxml/scripts/unpack.py is vulnerable to a Zip Slip attack when processing Office documents.
  • Evidence: The code uses zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path) without verifying that the filenames within the ZIP archive are safe. A malicious .docx or .pptx file could contain entries like ../../../../tmp/malicious.sh, which would be written outside the intended directory upon extraction.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The script ooxml/scripts/pack.py invokes the system binary soffice (LibreOffice) to perform document validation.
  • Evidence: subprocess.run(["soffice", "--headless", "--convert-to", ...]) is called on user-provided document paths. While the arguments are passed as a list to prevent shell injection, executing a complex office suite on untrusted files exposes the system to any vulnerabilities present in LibreOffice's parsers.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to how it handles external document data (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: ooxml/scripts/unpack.py extracts XML content from untrusted .docx, .pptx, and .xlsx files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted XML and text are processed without delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute system commands (soffice), write to the filesystem (zipfile), and modify XML structures.
  • Sanitization: While defusedxml is correctly used to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, there is no sanitization of the actual text content to prevent the agent from following instructions found inside a document.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:37 PM