Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted PDF documents via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdf2image. A malicious PDF could contain instructions in its text or metadata designed to override the agent's behavior. Because the skill has file-writing capabilities and executes system commands, this represents a significant attack surface. 1. Ingestion points: PDF files processed inscripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py, and examples inSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: None are present in the scripts or instructions. 3. Capability inventory: High-privilege actions including file creation (PdfWriter.write,image.save,json.dump) and shell command execution. 4. Sanitization: No validation or filtering is applied to the extracted PDF content. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies on external command-line utilities such as
pdftotext,qpdf, andpdftk, executing them via shell commands with arguments that may be derived from untrusted input files. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms a monkeypatch on thepypdflibrary at runtime to address a bug in selection list handling, which dynamically modifies the behavior of a dependency.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata