vllm-ascend
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The automated scan flagged a command in
scripts/deploy_service.shwhere a health check response is piped topython3. The actual command iscurl -s "http://localhost:$PORT/health" | python3 -m json.tool, which uses the standard Python JSON module for formatting and is not an execution of the response as code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill scripts utilize the
--trust-remote-codeflag (e.g., inscripts/benchmark.pyandscripts/deploy_service.sh). This is a legitimate vLLM feature for loading certain models but it allows execution of Python code bundled with the model weights. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted prompt data.
- Ingestion points: Prompts are processed through the
llm.generatemethod and the OpenAI-compatible server. - Boundary markers: The scripts do not implement specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages inference subprocesses and network service ports.
- Sanitization: There is no specific input validation or sanitization implemented in the provided skill scripts.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://localhost:$PORT/health - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata