airflow-hitl
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: LOWPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill implements operators designed to ingest data from external human responders which could influence agent logic.
- Ingestion points:
HITLOperator,HITLBranchOperator, andHITLEntryOperatoringest untrusted selections and form data. - Boundary markers: Absent; user inputs are directly passed into task results/XComs without specialized delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Inputs determine DAG execution paths (branching) and are utilized in downstream Python tasks.
- Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization logic is present in the provided implementation examples.
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (LOW): Documentation includes patterns for performing network operations to external Airflow REST APIs.
- Evidence: Example code in Step 4 utilizes
requests.getandrequests.patchto communicate with a host defined by environment variables. - Context: While safe as a template using
os.getenv, it represents an outbound network capability to non-whitelisted domains. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (LOW): The skill relies on external libraries without specifying or pinning versions.
- Evidence: Code examples require
requests,pendulum, andapache-airflow-providers-standard.
Audit Metadata