skills/atrislabs/atris/meta/Gen Agent Trust Hub

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Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill instructs the agent to use system commands like grep to search through log files (atris/logs/**/*.md). It also mentions file system operations such as creating symlinks in .claude/skills/.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): This finding relates to internal data exposure. The skill directs the agent to read and process potentially sensitive internal project data, including atris/MAP.md and the entire log history. If logs contain credentials or private data, the agent is being trained to expose this context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It relies on reading untrusted external data sources—specifically the atris/logs/ directory and LESSONS.md. These files may contain data from previous interactions that could include malicious instructions aimed at subverting the agent's logic during its 'Orient' phase. * Ingestion points: atris/logs/**/*.md, atris/policies/LESSONS.md. * Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to ignore or delimit embedded instructions within the logs. * Capability inventory: Execution of grep, writing to LESSONS.md, and the ability to load/route to other specialized skills. * Sanitization: Absent. Content from logs is processed directly without filtering.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:15 AM