xiaohongshu

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The setup-xhs-mcp skill downloads external resources including docker-compose.yml and compiled binaries from an untrusted GitHub repository (github.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of unverified remote code by fetching and running Docker containers and binary releases from a third-party source at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup-xhs-mcp script executes high-risk shell commands such as docker compose up -d and utilizes curl piped to shell logic to install the underlying MCP service.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files including ~/.claude/settings.json, .claude/settings.json, and .cursor/mcp.json to read and modify client configuration settings.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it retrieves and processes untrusted user-generated content from Xiaohongshu (notes and comments) which could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Content is ingested via list_feeds, search_feeds, and get_feed_detail in xhs-explore/SKILL.md and xhs-search/SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate retrieved content from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has write-capabilities including publish_content, post_comment_to_feed, and like_feed across multiple sub-skills.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of external social media content before it is presented to the agent model.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 02:52 AM