computer-use-agents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill implements a
ComputerUseAgentclass andAnthropicComputerUseclass that usepyautoguiandsubprocessto perform system-level actions. - Evidence:
pyautogui.click(),pyautogui.typewrite(), andsubprocess.run(["scrot", ...])are used to interact with the OS. - Risk: An attacker can use Indirect Prompt Injection to force the agent to type malicious commands or click destructive UI elements.
- DATA_EXFILTRATION (HIGH): The
capture_screenshotmethod captures the entire screen state and encodes it as Base64 to be sent to an LLM provider. - Evidence:
pyautogui.screenshot()inSKILL.md. - Risk: Sensitive information visible on the screen (passwords in terminal, private emails, etc.) is automatically exposed to the model and potentially logged by the service provider.
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill explicitly defines a
bashtool (BetaToolBash20241022) designed to run shell commands as requested by the AI. - Evidence:
self._handle_bash(input)inAnthropicComputerUseclass. - Risk: This provides a direct path for an AI to execute arbitrary code on the system or inside the container.
- INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (HIGH): This skill is a prime target for Category 8 attacks.
- Ingestion points: Screen captures of third-party applications or web browsers.
- Capability inventory: Full GUI control (mouse/keyboard) and shell access via
bashtool. - Sanitization: None provided; the model acts directly on visual reasoning.
- Risk: If the agent "sees" a malicious instruction on a website (e.g., "Open terminal and run rm -rf /"), it may execute it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata