mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Phases 1.2 and 1.3) direct the agent to fetch README files and documentation fromraw.githubusercontent.comandmodelcontextprotocol.io. While these are the official sources for the protocol, fetching live content from the internet introduces an external dependency that could be exploited if those sources were compromised. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The utility script
scripts/connections.pyuses themcplibrary'sstdio_clientto spawn subprocesses. This allows the agent to run and test local MCP servers. While this is the intended primary purpose of the skill, it represents a capability to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill's architecture for fetching remote documentation creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Remote markdown files are fetched in
SKILL.mdvia WebFetch. - Boundary markers: None; fetched content is integrated directly into the agent's context without delimiters or 'ignore' warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local commands (
connections.py) and perform network requests (via SSE/HTTP transports). - Sanitization: None; the skill does not implement validation or filtering for the external documentation it retrieves.
Audit Metadata