aviz-skills-installer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill is designed to clone content from
https://github.com/aviz85/claude-skills-library.git. This repository and organization are not part of the defined Trusted GitHub Organizations, making the source untrusted for automated code execution. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The primary function of
scripts/install-skill.shand the instructions inSKILL.mdis to download external code and immediately runnpm install. This facilitates the execution of unvetted third-party scripts and dependencies within the user's environment. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill performs several potentially dangerous shell operations including
git clone,mkdir -p,cp -r, andnpm install. These commands are used to modify the local filesystem and prepare new executable logic for the agent. - PERSISTENCE (MEDIUM): By installing new skills into
~/.claude/skills/, the installer creates a mechanism where downloaded code persists across all future agent sessions. If a downloaded skill is malicious, it gains permanent residency in the agent's logic path. - INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The skill fetches real-time data from
https://aviz.github.io/claude-skills-library/to determine which skills to install. This is a vulnerability surface where a compromised website could provide malicious installation instructions to the agent. - Ingestion points: WebFetch of
aviz.github.ioinSKILL.mdStep 2. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to use the fetched data to guide the installation flow.
- Capability inventory: Full filesystem access (write), network access (git), and command execution (npm).
- Sanitization: None detected; the agent processes the fetched skill names and URLs directly into shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata