notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes responses from Google NotebookLM (Gemini) and returns them to the agent.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/ask_question.pyandscripts/browser_session.pyextract text from the NotebookLM UI using CSS selectors (.to-user-container .message-text-content). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in the retrieved text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(found inscripts/run.py,scripts/__init__.py, andscripts/setup_environment.py). - Sanitization: Absent. Data retrieved from the browser is returned to the agent without validation or filtering.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the setup of its own environment and dependencies.
- Evidence:
scripts/setup_environment.pyinstalls Python packages fromrequirements.txtand downloads Google Chrome usingpatchright install chrome. - Context: These operations are restricted to the skill's isolated
.venvand are part of the documented setup process for the browser automation library used. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a wrapper script to manage execution within a virtual environment.
- Evidence:
scripts/run.pyusessubprocess.runto execute other Python scripts in the library (ask_question.py,auth_manager.py, etc.) using the.venvinterpreter. - Context: This is used for internal orchestration and environment isolation rather than executing arbitrary user-provided commands.
Audit Metadata