orchestrating-github-workflow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The preflight-checker-manifest.md file recommends the installation of multiple downstream skills from various individual GitHub repositories, such as obra/superpowers/writing-plans, softaworks/agent-toolkit/commit-work, and sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/clean-code. These repositories are not associated with trusted organizations or well-known services.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content from GitHub issues and comments is fetched and stored in docs/<ISSUE_SLUG>.md by the fetching-github-issue skill for processing.
  • Boundary markers: The artifact-validator.md subagent checks for specific Markdown sections but does not implement robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched issue data.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator dispatches tasks that can create GitHub issues (creating-github-child-issues), perform git commits, and execute code changes (executing-github-task).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of external content was found in the provided orchestration logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the GitHub CLI (gh) and the git CLI for repository and issue management. While necessary for the skill's function, these tools provide a broad range of capabilities over the user's environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 17, 2026, 09:12 AM