orchestrating-github-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
preflight-checker-manifest.mdfile recommends the installation of multiple downstream skills from various individual GitHub repositories, such asobra/superpowers/writing-plans,softaworks/agent-toolkit/commit-work, andsickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/clean-code. These repositories are not associated with trusted organizations or well-known services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content from GitHub issues and comments is fetched and stored in
docs/<ISSUE_SLUG>.mdby thefetching-github-issueskill for processing. - Boundary markers: The
artifact-validator.mdsubagent checks for specific Markdown sections but does not implement robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched issue data. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator dispatches tasks that can create GitHub issues (
creating-github-child-issues), perform git commits, and execute code changes (executing-github-task). - Sanitization: No evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of external content was found in the provided orchestration logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the GitHub CLI (
gh) and thegitCLI for repository and issue management. While necessary for the skill's function, these tools provide a broad range of capabilities over the user's environment.
Audit Metadata