generate-image
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate.tsperforms dynamic module loading by computing paths at runtime. It resolves the plugin's root directory by searching environment variables (e.g.,GEMSKILLS_ROOT) and local configuration files, then usesimport()to load core utilities from these computed paths. Additionally, the skill documentation describes a workflow that involves executing other local scripts viabun run, such as a preview server for browsing art styles. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8 surface) because it interpolates raw user input into a final prompt sent to external image generation models.
- Ingestion points: Raw image prompts are accepted as command-line arguments in
scripts/generate.tsandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: User input is directly concatenated with style hints and system instructions (e.g.,
finalPrompt = \${style.promptHints}, ${prompt}``) without any delimiters or specific instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (
saveImage) and makes network requests to Gemini and Replicate APIs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided prompt string before it is used in the final API request.
Audit Metadata