deploy-agent-team

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation (SKILL.md and references/permissions-and-isolation.md) instructs users to set mode: "bypassPermissions" for sub-agents. This configuration disables interactive approval for sensitive actions like bash command execution and file system modifications, allowing autonomous agent behavior without a human-in-the-loop.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The system architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection through specialist agents that process untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Agents such as the researcher (utilizing agent-browser) and marketer (utilizing x-research) are designed to ingest content from the public web and social media platforms as described in references/agent-roster.md.
  • Boundary markers: While a Boundaries section is suggested in the spawn prompt guide (references/spawn-prompt-guide.md), there are no specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious commands embedded in external data.
  • Capability inventory: Sub-agents possess significant capabilities, including tool invocation and file editing, which are particularly sensitive when permission prompts are bypassed.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not provide mechanisms for sanitizing or validating the untrusted content fetched by the specialist agents.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several agents in the roster, such as the integration-expert and researcher, utilize tools with network access (e.g., Resend API, web browsers). These capabilities enable agents to communicate with external domains, which could be misused for data transfer.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 03:57 AM