deploy-agent-team
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation (SKILL.md and references/permissions-and-isolation.md) instructs users to set
mode: "bypassPermissions"for sub-agents. This configuration disables interactive approval for sensitive actions like bash command execution and file system modifications, allowing autonomous agent behavior without a human-in-the-loop. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The system architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection through specialist agents that process untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Agents such as the
researcher(utilizingagent-browser) andmarketer(utilizingx-research) are designed to ingest content from the public web and social media platforms as described inreferences/agent-roster.md. - Boundary markers: While a
Boundariessection is suggested in the spawn prompt guide (references/spawn-prompt-guide.md), there are no specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious commands embedded in external data. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents possess significant capabilities, including tool invocation and file editing, which are particularly sensitive when permission prompts are bypassed.
- Sanitization: The skill does not provide mechanisms for sanitizing or validating the untrusted content fetched by the specialist agents.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several agents in the roster, such as the
integration-expertandresearcher, utilize tools with network access (e.g., Resend API, web browsers). These capabilities enable agents to communicate with external domains, which could be misused for data transfer.
Audit Metadata