gitlab-ci
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution] (CRITICAL): The skill documentation includes a command to download and execute a shell script from a remote URL with root privileges:
curl -L https://packages.gitlab.com/install/repositories/runner/gitlab-runner/script.deb.sh | sudo bash. Since the source is not in the Trusted External Sources list, this is a high-risk operation that bypasses verification. - [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The provided runner configuration (
config.toml) enablesprivileged = trueand mounts/var/run/docker.sock. This allows any job executed by the runner to escape the container and gain root access to the host machine. - [Persistence Mechanisms] (HIGH): The skill guides the user to install the
gitlab-runneras a system service usingsudo apt installandsudo gitlab-runner register, establishing a persistent background process that can execute arbitrary code received from the GitLab controller. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): Ingestion points: The skill uses
includeto pull in external CI/CD templates from other projects and remote templates. Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: The runner has the capability to execute arbitrary shell commands via thescriptparameter. Sanitization: Absent. This creates a large attack surface where external project maintainers can inject malicious commands into the pipeline context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata