OpenClaw Security Hardening

Use this skill to reduce exposure in self-hosted OpenClaw deployments before opening access to teammates or external networks.

Build a Threat Model First

Map the highest-risk assets and paths:

• Admin/API endpoints for OpenClaw
• Provider API keys and model credentials
• Prompt/response logs containing sensitive business data
• Host-level access (SSH, local admin accounts, remote desktop)

Prioritize controls that reduce credential theft, remote code execution blast radius, and data exfiltration.

Apply Baseline Host Hardening

1. Keep OS and package dependencies patched on a regular cadence.
2. Run OpenClaw as a dedicated non-admin user account.
3. Enable full-disk encryption and secure boot features where available.
4. Remove unnecessary services and block inbound ports by default.
5. Lock down remote admin (key-only SSH, no password login, limited source CIDRs).

Example Linux baseline checks:

id openclaw
sudo ss -tulpn
sudo ufw status verbose
sudo systemctl --failed

Harden Application Runtime

• Bind OpenClaw to localhost or private VLAN by default.
• Place a reverse proxy in front of OpenClaw for TLS, auth, and rate limits.
• Enforce authentication on every non-health endpoint.
• Disable debug/dev modes in persistent environments.
• Restrict outbound egress to only required providers (LLM API, telemetry sink, package mirror).

Example reverse proxy controls to enforce:

• TLS 1.2+ only
• strict transport security header
• request body size limits
• request timeout and upstream timeout guardrails
• per-IP and per-token rate limiting

Protect Secrets and Tokens

• Store secrets in a vault or platform secret manager, not committed .env files.
• Rotate provider and admin tokens on a fixed interval and after any incident.
• Scope tokens minimally (least privilege, per-service keys).
• Scan repos and deployment artifacts for leaked credentials before release.

Rotation checklist:

1. Generate replacement key.
2. Update runtime secret store.
3. Restart or reload OpenClaw.
4. Validate request success with new key.
5. Revoke old key.

Segment Network Access

Use layered access patterns:

• Tier 1 (private): OpenClaw service port reachable only from app/proxy subnet.
• Tier 2 (operator): Admin plane reachable only from VPN/Tailscale/WireGuard.
• Tier 3 (public): Expose only hardened reverse proxy with strict ACLs.

Do not publish raw OpenClaw service ports directly to the internet.

Add Detection and Recovery Paths

• Centralize auth, error, and audit logs.
• Alert on brute-force attempts, token failures, and unusual outbound traffic.
• Capture immutable backup snapshots of configs and prompt data retention settings.
• Test rollback and restore procedures every release cycle.

Minimum operational runbook:

• service restart path
• key revocation path
• incident isolation path (network block + token disable)
• known-good rollback version

Validation Checklist

• All sensitive endpoints require auth and are unreachable without VPN or gateway policy.
• Secrets are absent from repo history and plaintext shared directories.
• Host firewall default deny is active for inbound traffic.
• TLS termination and rate limits are active at ingress.
• Rollback drill can restore service within target RTO.

Related Skills

• openclaw-local-mac-mini - Local OpenClaw hosting setup
• multi-tenant-llm-hosting - Multi-tenant AI isolation patterns
• zero-trust - Private access and identity-aware network controls