gemini
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/patterns.mdmandate the use of the--approval-mode yoloflag. This configuration explicitly overrides manual approval requirements for tool execution by the Gemini agent, bypassing human-in-the-loop security controls. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute thegeminiCLI. The CLI is capable of executing arbitrary shell commands and performing file system operations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By combining the
yoloapproval mode with an autonomous agent (Gemini CLI), the skill facilitates the execution of AI-generated code and commands without user verification. This effectively creates an automated remote code execution pipeline if untrusted content is processed. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The integrated
geminiCLI includes capabilities likeweb_fetchandgoogle_web_search(documented inreferences/tools.md). When used in conjunction with file-reading capabilities, this presents a risk of data exfiltration if the agent is manipulated into sending local file content to external endpoints. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external data (prompts, codebase contents, web search results) through the Gemini CLI.
- Ingestion points: Prompts passed to
gemini "[prompt]"and data read viacodebase_investigatororweb_fetch. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided templates.
- Capability inventory: The CLI tools include
read_file,write_file,search_file_content, and shell command execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input prompt is performed before it is passed to the shell-based CLI execution.
Audit Metadata