paper-audit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The SKILL.md file defines an orchestration step that executes python "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/audit.py" $ARGUMENTS via a bash shell. Additionally, scripts/audit.py uses subprocess.run to dynamically execute multiple Python scripts (e.g., check_format.py, analyze_grammar.py) based on the input file type and language.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file scripts/parsers.py uses importlib.util to dynamically load and execute Python code from a computed path pointing to a sibling skill directory (latex-paper-en/scripts/parsers.py). This allows execution of code that is not contained within the audited skill's package.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user documents (PDF, TeX, Typst) and passes the extracted text as context to specialized LLM agents (Methodology, Domain, and Critical Reviewers). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a paper could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Document parsing in scripts/audit.py and scripts/pdf_parser.py.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided agent definitions.
  • Capability inventory: Uses the Task tool to spawn sub-agents for review phases.
  • Sanitization: PdfParser.clean_text in scripts/pdf_parser.py performs structure cleaning but does not sanitize against prompt injection patterns.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes an optional --online flag that, when enabled, allows scripts to make network requests to external services like CrossRef or Semantic Scholar for bibliography verification.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 03:23 PM