NYC

pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to extract text and tables from PDF files (pypdf, pdfplumber) and use this data to perform further actions, such as generating reports or filling forms.
  • Ingestion points: pypdf.PdfReader in scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, pdfplumber.open in scripts/extract_form_structure.py, and general text extraction in SKILL.md examples.
  • Boundary markers: None found. Extracted text is treated as raw data without delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (writer.write), execute shell commands (pdftotext, qpdf, pdftk), and use Python script generation/execution.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitizing extracted PDF content before it is processed or used in decision-making.
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to use command-line tools like qpdf, pdftotext, and pdftk. While these are standard tools, if used with filenames or arguments derived from unvetted PDF metadata (e.g., Title/Author extracted via pypdf), it could lead to argument injection vulnerabilities.
  • Local Data Exposure (LOW): The skill accesses local file paths to read and write PDFs. While expected for a PDF skill, the lack of sanitization on input files creates a risk where a malicious PDF could influence the agent to read or overwrite unintended local files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:08 AM