Bankr x402 SDK - Client Patterns

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected All findings: [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill is plausibly benign for its intended purpose (an SDK client that must sign and pay for operations), but it contains moderate supply-chain and operational risk: it requires a raw private key and passes it to a third-party SDK and to a local signer, and it allows API endpoint overrides. If the @bankr/sdk package or an overridden API URL is malicious or compromised, the private key and transaction data could be exposed or abused. Recommend treating this as suspicious until you confirm the SDK performs local-only signing and you restrict/validate any API URL overrides, add explicit approval steps before broadcasting transactions, and avoid logging sensitive transaction payloads. LLM verification: Functionally correct for its intended purpose, but presents a real risk: the code will unconditionally sign and broadcast transactions returned by a remote SDK, using a high-value private key loaded from environment. Allowing BANKR_API_URL overrides without constraints and lacking local validation/user confirmation makes the setup dangerous for production use. Recommendations: restrict BANKR_API_URL to trusted endpoints, use a constrained payment wallet with minimal funds, add transaction valida