endaoment
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the Endaoment API.\n
- Ingestion points: Charity names and descriptions are fetched from
https://api.endaoment.org/v1/orgsandhttps://api.endaoment.org/v1/orgs/ein/inscripts/search.sh.\n - Boundary markers: None present. The data is presented as raw text directly to the agent context.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute financial transactions (USDC donations) on the Base network via
scripts/donate.shand theBankrtool.\n - Sanitization: None. Descriptions are truncated to 200 characters but are not filtered for malicious instructions. An attacker could use a charity's description field to perform a prompt injection attack, potentially tricking the agent into donating to an incorrect address or increasing the donation amount.\n- [Command Execution] (LOW): The
scripts/donate.shscript relies on a relative path or environment variable to locate and execute an external dependency (Bankrskill script). While functional, this creates a reliance on specific local environment structures.\n- [External Downloads] (LOW): The skill performs network requests to non-whitelisted domains (api.endaoment.organdmainnet.base.org). Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], while these are required for functionality, they are not from the trusted sources list.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata