gitlawb

The snippet itself contains no explicit credential theft, persistence, or overt malicious primitives; however, it performs a high-risk supply-chain action by executing a remote installer directly (`curl ... | sh`) with no integrity verification. Additionally, registration target selection is environment-controlled (potential endpoint redirection). Without inspecting `install.sh` and the `gl` binary/commands, the presence of actual malware cannot be confirmed, but the security posture should be treated as a meaningful supply-chain risk requiring verification/hardening (e.g., pinning installer integrity and controlling/validating the node URL).

SUSPICIOUS: the skill is largely aligned with its stated decentralized-git purpose and uses mostly plausible publisher-owned install sources, but it grants broad high-impact agent actions and handles blockchain/private credentials. The main concern is not hidden exfiltration evidence; it is the combination of autonomous code-hosting actions, on-chain operations, and untrusted remote content processing through an external CLI/MCP toolchain.