omni-talos
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/provider-ctl.pyuses thesubprocessmodule to executesshanddockercommands on a remote host namedomni-provider. These commands are used to restart containers and fetch logs for administrative purposes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/provider-setup.mdreferences the use of Docker Compose to pull and run a container image from Sidero Labs (ghcr.io/siderolabs/omni-infra-provider-proxmox:local-fix). This is a legitimate dependency for the provider's operation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes logs from an external Docker container which could be influenced by external events or attackers.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/provider-ctl.pyscript retrieves logs from theomni-provider-proxmox-provider-1container via SSH and prints them for agent consumption. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the log content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to restart infrastructure containers, execute
omnictlcommands for cluster management, and modify Kubernetes resources via the provided scripts and reference tools. - Sanitization: The script attempts to parse logs as JSON to format them but falls back to printing raw strings if parsing fails, providing no filtering for malicious natural language instructions.
Audit Metadata