skill-planner

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Path traversal vulnerability in shell script operations. Variables task_number and project_name (extracted from specs/state.json) are used to construct file system paths without sanitization. Evidence: The skill executes mkdir -p "specs/${padded_num}_${project_name}" and writes to "specs/${padded_num}_${project_name}/.postflight-pending". If project_name contains directory traversal sequences like ../, the agent could be manipulated into creating or overwriting files outside of the intended specs/ directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data and maintains high-privilege capabilities. 1. Ingestion points: Data is read from specs/state.json and a subagent-generated metadata file (.return-meta.json) using jq. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. The skill delegates complex planning tasks to a subagent (planner-agent) by interpolating context data into a prompt without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary Bash commands, write/edit files, and spawn subagents with broad tool access. 4. Sanitization: Partial. While it correctly uses jq --arg for safely updating JSON files, it fails to sanitize data used in shell-level path construction and command arguments.
  • [SAFE] (SAFE): The skill employs safe jq practices by using --arg and --argjson flags to prevent JSON injection when processing task data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:19 PM