skills/benjaming/ai-skills/todo/Gen Agent Trust Hub

todo

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill dynamically constructs and executes bash commands using variables like $key, $PR_NUMBER, and $REPO which are extracted from external sources (Jira, GitHub). This presents a command injection risk if the source metadata is maliciously formatted to include shell metacharacters.
  • Evidence: Execution steps 3a and 3d use variables directly in bash calls: acli jira workitem view $key and gh pr view $PR_NUMBER --repo $REPO.
  • Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill demonstrates a high vulnerability surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) by ingesting untrusted content from multiple external platforms.
  • Ingestion points: Jira issue descriptions, Jira comments, Confluence pages, Slack search results, and GitHub PR bodies.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. External content is interpolated directly into the briefing presentation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permission to execute shell commands, write to the filesystem, and access Atlassian/Slack MCP tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested strings is performed before processing or display.
  • Credentials Unsafe (LOW): Sensitive credentials ($JIRA_API_TOKEN) are passed directly via command-line arguments in curl requests. This can lead to credential exposure in system process listings or shell history.
  • Evidence: curl -L -u "$JIRA_EMAIL:$JIRA_API_TOKEN" ... in Step 3a.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 08:02 AM