recall
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided arguments directly into shell commands without sanitization.
- Evidence: The skill uses variables like
${SCOPE}and${ACTION}in shell commands such asgit log --all --grep="(${SCOPE}",grep -E "^...\(${SCOPE}", andgit log --all --grep="${ACTION}(${SCOPE}". - Impact: A malicious user or input could execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a scope or action name containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons, ampersands, or pipes.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from git history.
- Ingestion points: Commit history bodies and diffs are read via
git logandgit diffas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions used to distinguish between data and commands in the synthesis process.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
git) and synthesizes summaries for the agent. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the commit content is performed before it is processed.
- Impact: Attackers who can contribute to the repository's git history can embed instructions that influence the agent's behavior or decision-making when the skill is used to recall context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata