skills/binbandit/kite/use-kite/Gen Agent Trust Hub

use-kite

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow in SKILL.md instructs the agent to execute cargo run or cargo install --path . when the kt CLI is not found. This leads to the execution of arbitrary code from the repository's local environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The kt land and kt undo commands described in references/cli-behavior.md perform high-impact history-rewriting operations, specifically git push --force-with-lease and git push --force, which can cause data loss.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation in references/cli-behavior.md explicitly lists environment variable names used for storing API keys, such as KITE_OPENAI_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY, facilitating potential discovery of secrets.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection during the kt land process.
  • Ingestion points: Git status and diff content are processed by the skill (referenced in references/cli-behavior.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the diff is passed directly to LLM providers.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses, rewrite Git history, and perform network requests (referenced in SKILL.md and references/cli-behavior.md).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of the diff content before LLM processing was found.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to local and remote API endpoints (http://localhost:11434/api/chat and OpenAI-compatible URLs) to generate content via external LLM providers.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 02:55 AM